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Abstract
T
he last decade of has been one of the most challenging periods for Euro-
pean integration. The decade started with a sovereign debt crisis that hit 
hard the Eurozone’s peripheral member states and ended with the economic 
wreckage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. As expected, the global 
fi nancial crisis and the Euro-crisis have had an impact in the orientation of 
the EU as a global economic power.Two of the main aspects of EU’s economic 
power are its trade and investment power.The aim of this paper is to provide 
an evaluation of the impact of the global fi nancial and Euro-crisis in the Euro-
pean Union’s performance on these two dimensions of the EU’s power.
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Κρίσεις και διεθνής οικονομική ισχύ της ΕΕ: Η εμπορική 
και η επενδυτική διάσταση
Παπανικολάου Κωνσταντίνος, Διδάκτορ Διεθνούς Πολιτικής Οικονομίας
Περίληψη
Η
τελευταία δεκαετία υπήρξε μία από τις πιο ιδιαίτερες χρονικές περιόδους για 
την Ευρωπαϊκή ολοκλήρωση. Η δεκαετία ξεκίνησε με μία κρίση χρέους που 
επηρέασε εμφατικά τα κράτη μέλη της περιφέρειας της Ευρωζώνης και τελείωσε 
το 2020 με μία οικονομική κρίση η οποία ήταν αποτέλεσμα της πανδημίας του 
Covid-19. Όπως αναμενόταν η παγκόσμια χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση και η κρίση 
χρέους επηρέασαν τον προσανατολισμό της Ε.Ε. ως παγκόσμιας οικονομικής 
δύναμης. Δύο βασικές διαστάσεις της οικονομικής ισχύος της Ε.Ε. είναι η 
εμπορική και η επενδυτική της ισχύς. Ο στόχος του συγκεκριμένου κειμένου 
εργασίας είναι η αξιολόγηση των επιδράσεων της παγκόσμιας χρηματοπιστωτικής 
κρίσης και της κρίσης χρέους του ευρώ στις επιδόσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης 
σε αυτές τις δύο διαστάσεις της ισχύος της. 
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ–ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: Κρίση χρέους του ευρώ, εμπορική ισχύς, επενδυτική 
ισχύς, Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση
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1. Introduction
T he last decade has been one of the most challenging periods for European integration. The decade started with a sovereign debt crisis that hit hard 
the Eurozone’s peripheral member states (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, 
Spain), and threatened the integrity of the entire euro area. The sovereign debt 
crisis occurred after the global fi nancial crisis of 2007-2009 which also had a 
negative impact οn the European economies. The decade ended with the eco-
nomic wreckage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, which still affects 
the European Union from one end to another (Matthijs 2020).
As expected, the global fi nancial crisis and the Euro-crisis have had an 
impact in the orientation of the EU as a global economic power. European Union 
is one of the major economic powers of the contemporary international system. 
EU’s weight and infl uence in the last two decades is signifi cant across all the 
dimensions of the global economy. Two of the main aspects of EU’s economic 
power are its trade and investment power. These two aspects are particularly 
signifi cant in times of crisis. EU’s presence in global multilateral system 
shapes both the European and international reaction to crises, while its policies 
regarding investment fl ows affect the duration and depth of a crisis, not only in 
the EU, but also in other areas of the global economy.  
The aim of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the impact of the global 
fi nancial and Euro-crisis in the European Union’s performance on these two 
dimensions of the EU’s power. This evaluation will also allow us to extract some 
fi rst tentative conclusions about the impact of the covid-19 crisis.  
2. European Union as a Global Economic Power
T
he EU is a sui generis actor in the international system. Not a typical 
nation-state, it constitutes the biggest and most successful example of re-
gional integration in modern history (Bindi 2009). A review of European and 
international literature on EU as a power in the international system reveals 
four basic attributes of EU’s power profi le, EU is considered a civilian, norma-
tive, soft and economic power. The EU is undoubtedly a global power with 
contradictory characteristics.
EU is the par excellence civilian power of the contemporary international 
system. Given that EU’s military capacity, as a unifi ed actor, is limited, the 
EU promotes its interests by deploying its diplomatic and political resources 
without resorting to military force. As a result, its presence and activity doesn’t 
create tensions and turbulences in global affairs (Cassarini 2007). On the other 
hand, the absence of military hard power and political consensus between the 
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Member states regarding foreign policy objectives, don’t allow the EU to be on 
equal footing with other great power- like the USA and China.    
Being widely recognized as a “creator of norms” and an “outward normative 
power” the EU has largely established (alongside the USA) the regulatory 
framework of global governance in the last three decades (Therborn 2011). EU 
is an international power that promotes its own economic and social model, 
based on the principles of liberal democracy and private but regulated market 
beyond its borders. The European economic and social acquis has been a popular 
example for several third counties (Hardacre & Smith 2009). 
These two preceding aspects make the EU a predominantly soft power. 
Μatching the defi nition of “soft power” to the international identity of European 
Union, EU express “its power by coercion and by using normative, economic and 
structural tools of foreign policy supplementary to hard power” (Nye 2005). 
Finally, the economy is one of the most identifying features of EU’s power 
profi le in the literature (Gamble & Lane 2009, Balfour & Emerson 2011). The 
European Union is not only the second biggest economic block of the global 
economy, but also the biggest exporter and the biggest provider of development 
aid, as well as the most important source and the second most important 
destination of Foreign Direct Investment (Papanikolaou 2021). Moreover, 
the euro, the common currency of the euro-zone, is the second most powerful 
international currency in the global monetary system.
The EU has established close trade and investment partnerships with 
the major economic powers of the global economy in the last two decades. In 
addition, it is considered to be a privileged economic partner for the majority 
of the developing countries. As noted by Smith (2014), “the EU is positioned 
between the East and West in the tri-polar international economic system of the 
21st century”.
3. Τhe EU and the crises
A
ccording to Womack (2017, p385), crises -whether political or economic-
“expose the foundational assumptions of the existing order and raise the 
prospect of a future order that is structurally different from the past’. A typi-
cal crisis begins with an event that shakes the credibility of the existing order 
and gives rise to growing concerns about the possibility of a transition to a new 
status quo.
The majority of crises are political, economic and social. Nevertheless, 
economic and social crises can also be caused by natural and human (health) 
disasters. There are many forms of economic crises, such as currency crises, 
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fi nancial crises, infl ation crises, debt crises, oil shocks and sovereign defaults 
(Reinhart & Rogoff 2011). Systemic crises are a result of gradual structural 
changes that take place in the longer term. On the other hand, emergency crises 
are also common, which do not result from gradual changes but rather from 
emergency events that shake the world order. The global fi nancial crisis (GFC) 
of 2007-2009 was the biggest fi nancial crisis of the global economy after the end 
of World War II. Despite the fact that the American fi nancial system was the 
starting point of the crisis, the crisis spilled quickly into the rest of the global 
economy. The crisis hit harder the developed economies including the EU. 
The Euro-crisis (2010-2015) was the second part of the global economic 
crisis. It was a regional crisis that hit very hard the Euro-zone, creating severe 
problems in the public fi nances of several member states and endangering the 
sustainability of the European banking system. While the crisis started in 
Greece, a small economy in the context of the Eurozone, the poor reaction of 
the European authorities, the vulnerabilities that had already emerged from 
the GFC in the European banking system, and the incomplete nature of the 
Eurozone turned the crisis into an existential crisis the European monetary 
union itself. 
The crises caused by natural and human disasters can easily evolve into eco-
nomic and social crises, given their severe economic and social consequences for 
societies. For example, the Covid-19 crisis started as a health crisis in February-
March 2020 and within a couple of months turned into a severe global economic 
crisis. European economies are among the most affected by the economic crisis 
of the pandemic.
During the last three quarters of 2020 and the fi rst quarter of 2021 the 
EU’s GDP recorded a cumulative decrease of 5%. Moreover in 2020 the trade of 
the European Union of 27 member states was hit hard by the pandemic, with 
a signifi cant reduction observed for both exports (-9.4%) and imports (-11.6%) 
compared with 2019 (Eurostat 2021). 
4. Changes in the trade and investment power of the EU 
during the decade 2008-2018
T
he aim of this section is to provide an evaluation of the changes that oc-
curred in the trade and investment power of the EU during the decade 
2008-2018. On the one hand, the position of the EU in the global trade and as 
a major investment player is being examined, and on the other hand, the Euro-
pean trade and investment policies and strategies are being evaluated during 
the specifi c period.
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4.1 Trends of global and European trade & European Union
The EU was the biggest trade bloc in the global economy during the decade 
2008-2018, although its share in international trade recorded a decrease of 18% 
during that period. More specifi cally in 2018 the share of the EU was 15.9% of 
total global trade compared to 18,5%  of total global trade in 2008 (Graph 1). 
The biggest decline of the European share was recorded in the period 2009-
2014 due to the recessionary consequences of the Euro-zone debt crisis on the 
European economies.
The variability of the trade performance of the European Union was critical 
regarding the total economic performance of the European countries, because of 
the great dependence of the European economies on international trade, in 2016 
the value of the EU exports of goods and services was equal to the 44% of its total 
GDP (Εurostat 2018).  
Graph 1: Changes in EU, USA and China trade shares




























The performance of the EU in the exports of goods and services recorded a 
small decrease during the decade. Specifi cally, the share of the EU in the exports 
of goods recorded a decrease of 3%. However due to the big increase of the Chi-
nese share of exports, the EU has dropped in the second position of the world 
ranking for the exports of goods (Graph 2). Respectively, the share of the EU in 
the exports of services recorded a decrease of 4% (Εurostat 2018). However, de-
spite this decline, EU remained in the fi rst position of the world ranking for the 
export of services. 
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Graph 2: Changes in EU, USA and China export trade shares

























Despite the decrease in its export performance, the trade balance of the EU 
has changed from a defi cit of €205 billion in 2008 to a surplus of € 214 billion 
in 2017 (Graph 3). The positive change of the trade balance of the EU occurred 
mainly due to the bigger decrease of the European imports in comparison with 
the much smaller decrease of the European exports.  


























Despite the negative impact of the crisis in its performance, the EU remains 
a great trade power. Its trade power is still the most powerful source of its total 
economic power. In the eve of the pandemic, EU had the biggest share globally 
in total trade, the biggest share in the exports of services and the second biggest 
share in the exports of goods. Furthermore, EU was the trade bloc with the 
widest geographic infl uence in the multilateral trade system1.
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Because of the size of its market and its share of world imports, its trade 
policies, use of export subsidies, imposition of anti-dumping measures, and 
regulatory barriers to trade have signifi cant implications for the producers and 
service providers of other countries. 
4.2 Trends of Global and European FDI
The EU was the biggest recipient of inbound investment fl ows in the global 
economy during the decade 2008-2018. In 2011 the amount of inbound investment 
fl ows in the Member States of the EU exceeded the 400 billion dollars, almost 
double the amount of the inbound investment fl ows of the American economy. 
Due to the consequences of the euro-crisis, in 2014 the amount of the European 
inbound fl ows was reduced by 50% in comparison to 2011 (Graph 4). In the three-
year period 2015-2017 the trends in the inbound fl ows stabilized and as a result, in 
2017 the inbound investment fl ows in the European economies reached 300 billion 
dollars matching the inbound fl ows to the American economy (OECD 2018).
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The EU was the world’s largest exporter of international investments during 
the decade 2008-2018 exceeding the respective performances of other great 
economic powers such as the United States and China. In 2011, the amount 
of the European investment funds that were channeled in third countries was 
over half trillion dollars, equal to the amount of the American and the Chinese 
investment funds combined (Graph 5). 
In the next three years, due to the consequences of the euro-crisis, the level 
of the European outbound fl ows was reduced by 30%. In 2015 the European 
outbound fl ows reached the peak of the decade exceeding 700 billion dollars. In 
the next four years due to various reasons, the amount of the European outbound 
fl ows has been reduced to the level of 2013 remaining however well ahead of that 
of the USA and China (Graph 5). 
The companies that have their fi nancial and administrative basis in EU 
member states, faced a shock during the Euro crisis. The crisis of the European 
banks and the restrictions in credit provision was critical regarding the diffi culties 
that “European” companies faced (Bekes et al. 2011). Affected by these credit 
conditions but also the twin recession of the European economy during the 2010s 
the presence of the “European” companies in the classifi cation of the bigger 
multinational companies of the global economy was weakened. 
Graph 6: Changes in the hierarchy of the multi-national companies 













Source: Forbes 2018, Papanikolaou 2021.
4.3 EU trade policy
Trade politics is arguably one of the most important dimensions for defi ning 
how the EU is understood by international economic organizations and third-
country fi rms and governments. The EU’s economic capacity, which trade 
policy seeks to harness, is central to depictions of the Union as a global actor 
and trade policy is Europe’s most potentially potent foreign policy instrument 
(Young & Peterson 2014).  
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The European Commission contended that “effective trade policy is 
critical… in projecting EU values and interests in the world».2 Undoubtedly 
trade is the economic strength of the Union that provides the foundation for all 
its external activities (Bretherton & Vogler 2006). Trade is at the very core of the 
EU’s potential or actual power and it uses its power through trade to promote 
European values and principles (Meunier & Nicolaidis 2006). It is the Union’s 
formidable economic power that is at the centre of the characterization of the EU 
as a civilian and normative power. 
In 2006 the Commission spelled out the “Global Europe” strategy. Central 
aim of the Global Europe Strategy was the promotion of free and open trade 
as a mean to foster growth, employment and development and also to continue 
being at the head of the international trading system.3 The most distinctive 
aspect of Global Europe was its emphasis on pursuing market access trough 
bilateral agreements. The focus on economically signifi cant markets represented 
a departure from the EU’s existing trade agreements. Global Europe presaged 
a shift from multilateralism to competitive liberalization, a situation where 
the EU and the US compete with each other to secure access to valuable third 
markets (Heron & Siles-Brugge 2012). 
In the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis and given the unfolding Euro-
zone Crisis, the greatest perceived threat in the eyes of EU trade policymakers 
has been the potential for protectionist tendencies to develop, as these threaten 
not only the EU’s external trade agenda but also the liberalism if its import 
policies (Siles Brugge 2014). 
In 2010 the European Commission spelled out how trade policy would 
support the objectives of the EU’s 2020 growth strategy, a broad program for 
economic recovery from the post-2008 recession.4 The central aim of the “Trade, 
Growth and World Affairs” strategy was to boost foreign demand for European 
goods and services while increasing European Union competitiveness by the 
opening Europe to FDI. The only signifi cant variation with respect to the 2006 
strategy was in terms of the new emphasis placed in “reciprocity”. This emphasis 
was based in the perception that EU has the ability to use access to its market as 
a tool to exact concessions from trading partners (Siles Brugge 2014).
The European Commission affi rmed the agenda of Global Europe Strategy in 
pursing ambitious bilateral trade agreements with important trading partners in 
order to increase the geographical trade infl uence of the EU.5 There was also an 
even more explicit focus on the EU’s largest trading partners, and the emerging 
economies: the US, China, Russia, Japan, India and Brazil. Moreover, the 
European Commission stressed the “depth and quality” of trade relationships, 
leading to a focus on regulatory barriers to goods and services. 
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In the years after 2010 the EU embraced a more assertive strategy in order 
to defend its economic interests with greater self-confi dence. For example, the 
EU has given greater emphasis on enforcement in order to ensure that other 
trade power abided by the agreements, and that the Union is using trade defense 
instruments to combat unfair trade practices. As Commissioner De Gucht stated 
“the EU should remain an open economy, not a disarmed economy”.6 In contract 
to certain provisions of Global Europe, which envisaged reform of the EU’s anti-
dumping practices to make them more liberal, the Commission rejected any 
reform of anti-dumping until the conclusion of WTO negotiations in order to 
“avoid efforts being portrayed as unilateral disarmament”.7 The provisions of 
this new trade strategy of the EU were designed to be more pragmatic in order 
to protect on better terms the trade interests of the EU in the global economy.  
In 2018 EU was involved in a serious trade dispute with the U.S. because 
of the protective measures of Trump’s administration. The EU responded to the 
U.S. imposition of tariffs on EU exports of steel and aluminum in three ways- 
fi lling a dispute settlement case in the WTO, applying rebalancing tariffs under 
Article XVIII of the WTO’s GATT and readying safeguard actions against a 
possible surge in steel and aluminum imports that have been defl ected from the 
U.S. market (European Parliament 2018). 
4.4 EU investment policy
The cacophony created by the absence of EU competence in foreign investment 
policy in the past had affected the European’s ability to speak with a unitary 
and coherent voice in global investment governance. The Member states had 
disparate, heterogeneous preferences when it came to managing the inbound 
FDI in the single market and when it came to promoting the European 
outbound FDI in the global markets. When it comes to shaping the international 
environment for outbound investment, the EU wasn’t able to impose its norms, 
values and rules on the rest of the world. Cacophony and lack of cohesiveness 
have prevented the EU to have a signifi cant infl uence on the international 
investment regimes in a way commensurate with its place as the world leading 
exporter of FDI (Bungenberg 2011).
When it comes to market access, the EU wasn’t able to capitalize on the size 
of its single market, which is a very attractive destination to foreign investors. 
Because the member states were negotiating on their own and rarely acted 
cooperatively, they couldn’t use the market power of the whole EU (Meunier 
2014). The Lisbon Treaty transferred competence by subsuming foreign direct 
investment under the common commercial policy. Therefore, the Commission 
negotiates BITs, protects EU outbound FDI abroad and regulates inbound FDI 
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on behalf of the member states. In the last decade the EU has started to speak 
with a single voice in the fi eld of foreign investment policy.
In December 2012, the “grandfathering regulation” was adopted.8 The 
“grandfathering regulation” was the establishment of transitional arrangements 
for bilateral investment treaties between Member States and third countries. 
The goal of the European institutions was to clarify the relationship of the 
bilateral agreements with Union law and policies. The long-term goal was the 
progressive replacement of these agreements by investment agreements of the 
Union.9 In 2015 the EU agreed on a reformed investment dispute settlement 
approach through the proposal for an Investment Court System which should 
culminate in a permanent multilateral investment court project to rule on 
investment disputes.
EU has sought to exercise comprehensively its investment power by requiring 
that an investment agreement should include fair and equitable treatment 
(FET), full protection and security, national treatment and most-favored nation 
(MFN) treatment as well as guarantees against uncompensated expropriation 
and an umbrella clause (Chaisse 2012). It seems that the EU is determined to 
seek a high level of protection for its investors abroad. While promoting a high 
level of investor protection, EU seeks to increase Europe’s attractiveness as a 
destination for foreign investment. The investment treaties of EU include all 
the standards of treatment currently contained in EU Member State investment 
treaties. The most important standards of treatment are the umbrella clauses, 
the non-discrimination standards, fair and equitable treatment as well as full 
protection and security, transfer clauses and expropriation (Chaisse 2012). 
4.5 EU trade and investment agreements
Within the global economy, the EU and the US are engaged in a form of structural 
competition in which each uses bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements 
to protect and advance their respective economic interests. Globalization has 
made such competition even more complicated. As we saw above, the EU for its 
part has attempted to manage globalization by combining liberalization with 
formal and informal practices to bind market players and their governments 
(Sbragia 2010). 
Since both economic powers have major states in third markets, neither 
can afford to ignore the other’s actions into such markets. Competition between 
US and EU fi rms for access to those markets underpins much of the external 
politics of trade and investment for both players, and that structural competition 
represents an important element of trade and investment policy in both (Sbragia 
2010). 
perifereia t.11.indd   71 28/5/2021   12:53:52 µµ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:16:26 |
[72] ΠΕΡΙΦΕΡΕΙΑ 
One of the main elements of the economic strategy of the European Union 
during the crises was the establishment of trade and investments agreements 
with an increasing number of countries. The majority of these agreements 
concerned countries of Asia, South America and Africa. According to the Tables 
1 & 2, the trade and investment agreements that EU signed during the decade 
2010-2020, include agreements with three developed industrial countries (Japan, 
Canada, South Korea), two big countries of South America (Peru, Colombia) and 
two countries of Eastern Europe (Serbia, Ukraine). EU is currently negotiating 
large scale trade agreements with big developed and developing economies such 
as Australia and India as well as with important regional economic blocs such 
as Mercosur and ASEAN. The collective gravity of the partners of the EU in the 
global economy indicates the importance of the agreements regarding the trade 
and investment performance of the EU. 













Mercosur 2019/Initial political agreement
ASEAN, Australia, India Under negotiation
Source: European Commission 2020.
The extension of the network of trade agreements was a strategic choice 
of the EU in order to maximize the economic benefi ts, while compensating for 
the recessional impact of the euro crisis. According to European Commission’s 
statistics, some of the trade agreements that EU singed, had a measurable 
benefi t for the European trade performance. For example, fi ve years after the 
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implementation of the free trade agreement between the EU and South Korea, the 
exports of goods from the EU to the Asian country grew by 55%, facilitated by the 
provisions of the agreement (European Commission 2016). Respectively two years 
after the implementation of the free trade agreement between EU and Canada, 
the European exports to Canada grew by 22% (European Commission 2019). 
The opening up of more markets for European exports compensated in some 
extent the loss of shares in other important markets to the European exporting 
interests. It is worth mentioning that the benefi ts from the trade agreements 
were equally shared among the member states of the European Union (Παπανι-
κολάου 2021). The exporting economies of EU, mainly the economies of Western 
and Northern Europe have benefi ted more than the economies of the South and 
the Eastern countries of Europe.
Τhrough the investment agreements, the European Union seeks to promote 
the increase of European investments in third countries, while seeking to facili-
tate the attractiveness of foreign investors in order to invest in the European 
economies. The real priorities in the EU investment policy consist of two impor-
tant features. First, setting improved standards of investment protection will 
lead to innovations in rule-making in the international investment regime by 
creating new rights and obligations. Secondly, it gives preference and change 
the paradigm of EU approach towards investment liberalization (Chaisse 2012). 
“Trade for All” is the new trade and investment strategy for the European 
Union, proposed by the European Commission in 2015. The central aim of 
“Trade for All” is the strengthening of the trade and investment performance of 
the EU in the evolving global economy. It prioritizes concluding major ongoing 
projects like the Doha Round of WTO talks, the EU-Japan FTA and the EU-
China investment agreement. It opened the door to new negotiations in the 
vital Asia-Pacifi c region (like FTA with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines 
and Indonesia) and plans a deepening of the EU’s relationships with African 
partners. Thirdly it modernized existing FTA with Mexico and Chile (European 
Commission 2015).10 
On the top of all trade and investment agreements of this specifi c period was 
the TTIP, the proposed trade agreement between the EU and USA. According 
to K. de Gucht, the TTIP would have been the largest bilateral trade initiative 
ever negotiated not only because it would have involved the two largest economic 
areas but also because of its potential global reach in setting an example for 
future agreements.11 Negotiations were halted by the decision of D. Trump’s ad-
ministration, which considered that TTIP wasn’t in favor of the American trade 
interests.12
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Table 2. EU Investment Agreements during the decade 2010-2020
South Korea 2011
Canada 2012
Economic Communities of East & South Africa 2012








Source: European Commission 2020.
5. Crises and EU’ status as a global economic power
T
he global fi nancial crisis and the euro-crisis were two events that affected 
the European infl uence in the international system and brought about sig-
nifi cant changes to the international balance of power. These changes have 
served, among others, as a warning for EU authorities to reinforce European 
economic power, in order for the Union to become a more competitive player in 
the international economic competition. 
European Union’s share in international trade recorded a decrease of 18% 
during the decade 2008-2018. The share of EU in exports of goods recorded a 
decrease of 3% while its share in the exports of services recorded a decrease of 4% 
in the same period. The consequences of the euro crisis in the European economies 
had a negative impact on the European weight in the international trade. 
The investment performance of EU was also affected during the two 
crises. The attractiveness of the Single Market as an investment destination 
declined the decade 2008-2018. The level of the inbound investment fl ows in 
member states of EU in 2018 recorded a decrease of 25% compared to the level 
of the inbound fl ows in 2008. The recessional consequences of the crises in the 
European economies had negative implications in the investment environment 
of the European Union.
The investment activities of the European multinational companies recorded 
an even bigger decrease during the decade 2008-2018. The level of the European 
outbound fl ows in the global economy were reduced by 40% in 2018 compared 
to the level of the outbound fl ows in 2008. The consequences of the crises in 
the European economies had a signifi cant impact on the ability of European 
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companies to compete with the American and Chinese companies for bigger 
shares in the global market. 
All in all, the EU recorded signifi cant fall in its economic power compared 
with the pre-crises period. EU is the economic power that was affected more by 
the two economic crises in comparison with the other major economic powers. 
Still, the EU remains an economic superpower having signifi cant infl uence in all 
the dimensions of the global economy. The position of the Single market in the 
global economy, its trade and investment performance as well as the signifi cant 
infl uence of the single currency are the main sources of the European economic 
power in the contemporary international system. 
The strategy of the EU in trade and investment during the crisis period has 
gradually shifted to become more pragmatic and to have a more defensive and 
reciprocal character than in the pre-crises period. This shift was affected by the 
pressure imposed mainly by the two economic crises, which forced EU to make 
signifi cant changes in its trade and investment strategy in order to participate 
on better terms in the global economic competition. Moreover, the emphasis on 
enforcement in general, and trade defense instruments in particular, was based 
on the need to secure real benefi ts for European fi rms. 
During the 2010s trade and investment diplomacy became a more critical 
tool of the EU foreign policy. The Union used trade and investment policies 
most actively as tool to try to infl uence the political behavior of other states. 
Furthermore, it used tools of trade and investment diplomacy in order to respond 
to offensive actions taken by other economic powers (USA, China, Russia) against 
the European economic interests. 
Despite the shifts on the trade and investment strategy, the EU continues 
to constitute the most authentic supporter of the international liberal economic 
order placed between the two other great economic powers (USA, China), which 
are engaged in a bipolar confrontational competition during the last decade. The 
EU managed to maintain during the two crises a position of balance between the 
two powers, sometimes adopting approaches closer to the American views, and 
sometimes closer to the Chinese positions. This position between the USA and 
China was even more diffi cult during the years of Trump’s administration and 
the isolationist shift of the USA in various issues of global economic governance. 
The global normative governance and the global trade governance were the 
main sectors where there was a difference of opinions between Brussels and 
Washington regarding the evolution of the global economy.
At this point, a question arises, namely whether and how the Covid-19 
crisis will affect the orientation of the EU as a global actor and the international 
balance of power. The pandemic of Covid-19 has served as a double catalyst. On 
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the one hand, it tested the resilience of the EU and its member-states, which are 
positioned between China, where the crisis started, and the US, where the crisis 
escalated. On the other hand, it is a test for the balance of power between the 
three major economic powers (Gomart & Martini, 2020).
Notes
1. For a signifi cant number of economies in the world, their leading export and 
import trading partner in terms of value is the European Union.
2. European Commission 2012a :2
3. European Commission 2007: 26
4.  European Commission 2010e: 1
5. European Commission 2010e: 11
6. De Gucht 2011b: 2
7. European Commission 2010g
8. Regulation No. 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 
December 2012 Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment 
Treaties Between Member States and Third Countries, O.J. (L 351) 40.
9. Report on the application of Regulation (EU) 1219/2012 establishing 
transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member 
States and third countries (europa.eu)
10. Trade for All - Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy 
(europa.eu)
11 Karel de Gucht, Foreword in J. Morin, T. Novotna, F. Ponjaert & M. Telo, 
The Politics of Transatlantic Trade Negotiations, TTIP in a Globalized World, 
Routledge, 2015, p. 17
12. The negotiations ended without conclusion at the end of 2016. A Council 
decision of 15 April 2019 stated that the negotiating directives for the TTIP are 
obsolete and no longer relevant.
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